

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

Spain Under the Republic

December 20, 1933

Vol. IX, No. 21

25¢
a copy

Published Fortnightly
by the

\$5.00
a year

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
INCORPORATED

EIGHTEEN EAST FORTY-FIRST STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

SPAIN UNDER THE REPUBLIC

by

BAILEY W. DIFFIE

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

The author of this report received his Ph.D. from the University of Madrid in 1929, following a residence of two years in Spain. He has recently returned from his third extended visit to that country.

INTRODUCTION

ALFONSO XIII fled Spain on April 14, 1931, leaving a new republic behind him.¹ Spain's First Republic had been ended by a military coup in 1874 after ten and a half months of ineffectual existence.² Would the Second Republic meet a similar fate? During the First Republic, Spain had been ruled in succession by four Presidents, none of whom had sufficient strength either in the Cortes or in the country to bring order out of the chaos left by the Monarchy. Would the Second Republic produce men of greater ability? The first Republic lacked organized parties strong enough to maintain it. Would the Second Republic develop such parties?

The First Republic had been a product of Liberalism, the Second Republic of Socialism combined with Liberalism. The prominence of the Socialists in Spain's second essay at republicanism served to raise a number of other questions. Would the Socialists succeed in dominating the new régime and use it to transform Spain into a socialist state? Would the Republic succumb in the end to reactionary forces, or would Spain, like Russia, carry through its revolution even at the cost of dictatorship? The program of the First Republic was entirely political in character. It sought to construct a new Spain without fundamentally modifying existing economic conditions. The presence of the Socialists in the Second Republic committed it to economic reforms. Were the Socialists strong enough to impose their program, or would they be placed in a position of responsibility while lacking adequate authority? These and many other questions confronted the new Republic. Although it is still too early to answer them all in full, it is now possible to determine the general direction in

which Spain has traveled during the last two and a half years.

The fall of Alfonso XIII and the establishment of the Republic were precipitated by the decisive victory of Republicans and Socialists in the municipal elections held throughout Spain on April 12, 1931.³ This victory was brought about by a coalition of anti-Monarchical groups, some of which had been in existence since the fall of the First Republic, while others were of recent origin. In the fifty years preceding 1931 anti-Monarchical strength had increased—slowly until 1923, and rapidly after that date. The main factors which determined the development of anti-Monarchist feeling were the gradual industrialization of Spain, which produced an urban proletariat organized into revolutionary labor unions, and a changing agrarian system which created a large rural proletariat. Among immediate factors, the most important was the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.⁴ This dictatorship, established in 1923, broke down the old political parties on which the Crown had relied, split the army into factions, and threw many staunch Monarchists into republican ranks, thus reviving Republicanism. When the former adherents

3. For the electoral results, cf. *Anuario Estadístico de España* (Madrid, Instituto de Geografía, 1931), p. 482. In the whole of Spain 80,472 municipal councillors were elected by 5,440,103 voters, of whom 1,104,159, or about 20 per cent, lived in provincial capitals. This 20 per cent elected only 1,729 councillors, or about 2 per cent of the total. Of these 1,729 councillors the anti-Monarchists gained 1,065. If the cities had been allotted a number proportionate to their population, they would have named some 16,000 councillors. For example: Barcelona had one councillor for every 5,350 voters, Madrid one for every 4,620, while Soria a small town in the conservative section of Spain, could boast of a councillor for every 150 voters, and Avila and Teruel, also small towns, had a councillor for every 165 voters. The number of councillors elected, therefore, did not represent the relative voting strength of Monarchists and anti-Monarchists. In all Spain 34,368 Republicans, 4,813 Socialists, 19,035 Monarchists, 67 Communists, 15,198 representatives of local parties, and 6,991 unclassified candidates were elected. All those not Republicans, Socialists or Communists were considered Monarchists. The Monarchists had, on this basis, 51.5 per cent of the total number of the councillors to 48.5 for the anti-Monarchists. The anti-Monarchists carried 46 of the 50 provincial capitals, however, and showed great strength in the large cities.

4. Agnes S. Waddell, "Spain under the Dictatorship," *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*, September 4, 1929.

1. William E. Linglebach, "The Spanish Revolution," *Current History*, June 1931.

2. Pío Zabala y Lera, *Historia de España, 1808-1923* (2 vols., Barcelona, Sucesores de Juan Gili, 1930) II, p. 23-34; Joseph A. Brandt, *Toward the New Spain* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 173-353.

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, VOL. IX, No. 21, DECEMBER 20, 1933

Published by-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated, 18 East 41st Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A. RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL, President; WILLIAM T. STONE, Vice President and Washington representative; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; HELEN TERRY, Assistant Editor. Research Associates: T. A. BISSON, VERA MICHELES DEAN, HELEN H. MOORHEAD, ONA K. D. RINGWOOD, MAXWELL S. STEWART, CHARLES A. THOMSON, M. S. WERTHEIMER, JOHN C. DEWILDE. Subscription Rates: \$5.00 a year; to F. P. A. members \$3.00; single copies 25 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

of the King were drawn by what they considered persecution into union with the anti-Monarchical groups of laborers and republicans, it was inevitable that the Monarchy should fall; no one was left to support it.

When the returns of April 12, 1931 showed a decided republican victory in the principal cities and towns, the King was faced with the choice of yielding or maintaining himself by force.⁵ General Berenguer, Minister of War, and General Sanjurjo, Commander of the Civil Guard, refused to repress the people. Failing to obtain the necessary support, the King left Madrid on the night of April 14, 1931. A Provisional Government, with Niceto Alcalá-Zamora as President, had already been formed.⁶

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORTES

For three months after the establishment of the Republic, the Provisional Government ruled alone without the aid of a Cortes. In some cases the work of the Provisional Government was practically definitive, but all actions taken in the first three months had later to be ratified by the Cortes, and the election of this legislative body was one of

the first concerns of the new government. Before the elections to the Cortes, scheduled for June 28, 1931, the government took a new electoral census, lowered the voting age from 25 to 23, and fixed the representation at one deputy for every 50,000 of population, making the total number of deputies 470 and giving the urban centers more equitable representation.⁷ Practically the only issue presented to the people was approval or disapproval of the Revolution. The sharp differences which were to develop later had not yet come into the open, and the Republicans and Socialists presented a coalition ticket. The opposition consisted of a few remnants of the old political parties. The Monarchists presented no ticket, but the Agrarian and Basque-Navarre parties represented the forces of the old régime. The Socialist-Republican coalition won a decisive victory.⁸ The opposition elected about 60 deputies drawn from the Agrarians, the Basque-Navarre party, and independents of known Right leanings. There was also a small group on the Left which later turned Communist. The new Cortes assembled on July 14, 1931.⁹

BUILDING A NEW SPAIN

The accomplishments of the Spanish Republic have been considerable, when the difficulties and opposition which it faced are taken into consideration. The Cortes framed one of the most progressive of modern constitutions. The army has been reorganized, two-thirds of its officers retired, its technical equipment improved and much of its political significance removed. Church and State have been separated, the Jesuits dissolved and their property expropriated, the property of the Church nationalized, the religious orders submitted to a law of associations, and forbidden to engage in commerce or industry, or to teach. Civil marriage and divorce have been made legal.

In the field of social legislation the Republic has made notable achievements. A complete new system of laws is designed to give the worker full protection of labor and wages. Workers are guaranteed rights of collective bargaining, protected by the *Jurados mixtos* and the Labor Delegates, and given the benefits of social insurance. The Labor Department has been reorganized in

such a way that it affords a real protection to the worker. The Agrarian Reform Law, which legalized redistribution of land, was well in operation by the autumn of 1933. The Catalan question, for centuries a source of trouble, has been handled in a way that made a definite solution seem possible in the near future by distributing administrative powers between the state and the region. A tremendous stride toward revolutionizing the schools has been made by the establishment of more than nine thousand new schools, the reorganization of the normal schools and the general increase in the pay of teachers. For the first time in the history of Spain thousands of poor children have been placed in the class room. Finally, the Republic began the building of important public works such as irrigation projects, hydro-electric plants, highways, electrified railways, port facilities, and houses for the poor.

THE CONSTITUTION

Spain's new political structure as outlined by the Constitution¹⁰ consists of a single-chamber Cortes elected for four years, a President elected for six years, a Supreme Court and a Tribunal of Constitutional Guar-

5. Comte de Romanones, "La Republique en Espagne," *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Paris), July 15, 1931.

6. The final scenes are given in what is probably a fairly accurate account by Julián Cortes Cavanillas, *La Caída de Alfonso XIII* (Madrid, Librería de San Martín, 1933), p. 207 et seq.

7. In the last Cortes of the Monarchy, which had 414 deputies, the rural districts were favored. Under the new apportionment, Barcelona gained 12 and Madrid 13 representatives, and other urban centers made gains while some of the country districts either remained stationary or lost. For the pre-Republic figures, cf. *España* (Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1925), p. 524-27; for Republican figures, cf. *Ley Electoral*, published in the *Biblioteca Oficial Legislativa*, Vol. XXVI, by Editorial Reus (Madrid, 1920 and 1933).

8. The Socialists elected 116 deputies; the Radicals 90; the Radical Socialists 60; the Progressives (Right Republican of Alcalá-Zamora and Miguel Maura) 22; the Republican Action 30; the Federals 17; the Galician Left 16; and the Catalan Left 43. *Luz* (Madrid), March 3, 1932; *Anuario*, cited, 1931, p. 487. These figures include the deputies chosen in subsequent supplementary elections.

9. *El Sol* (Madrid), and other Spanish papers printed the proceedings of the Cortes.

10. For English text, cf. *Current History*, June 1932.

antees. The President may appoint a Premier responsible to the Cortes, and the Premier with his Cabinet are responsible for the program of the government, as in England and France. The Constitution breaks abruptly with Spain's past, declaring that "Spain is a democratic republic of workers of all classes." Reversing the policy followed for centuries, it declares that "the Spanish State has no official religion," and establishes freedom of worship,¹¹ right of divorce, civil marriage and lay education. Property is subject to expropriation for social uses, and the state may intervene in the direction and control of industry, or nationalize public utilities. "Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy," and provides that the President may wage war and make peace "subject to the conditions prescribed in the Covenant of the League of Nations."

Spain becomes a federative, although not necessarily a federal, republic by Article 8, providing that "regions constituting autonomous governments" may be established and frame a charter which "the Spanish State shall recognize . . . and uphold . . . as an integral part of the national law." This allows such regions as Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque provinces to organize governments competent to handle local affairs, and sets up standards for determining which powers shall be held by the central government and which by the regions. Such regions are not considered to be sovereign states voluntarily surrendering their prerogatives to the central government. Article 18 provides that "all powers not explicitly granted in the charter of an autonomous region shall be considered as reserved to the Spanish State."

Among the most revolutionary provisions of the Constitution are those relating to the Church. In addition to the provisions mentioned above, the Constitution states that "all religious denominations shall be considered as associations subject to special laws," withdraws the state subsidy hitherto granted the Church and empowers the Cortes to dissolve religious orders dangerous to the state. The Constitution also limits their rights of commerce, industry and teaching, and the Cortes may confiscate their property.

Conflict over the status of the Church caused the first break in the revolutionary coalition. The Socialists had called for the "ultimate destruction of the Church," and had demanded a provision in the Constitution stating that "all religious orders shall be expelled and their property seized."¹² Alcalá-

Zamora and Maura were opposed to such drastic action and favored a moderate policy. As finally adopted, the Constitution chose a middle course, calling for dissolution of the Jesuits, but leaving the status of the other orders to decision by the Cortes. Alcalá-Zamora and Maura, however, resigned in protest against the anti-clerical articles and a new government was formed by Manuel Azaña on October 14, 1931.

Other important Articles of the Constitution extended the vote to all citizens 23 years of age or over, guaranteed freedom of speech and the press, and provided against arbitrary arrest. The right to expropriate property with compensation and "the socialization of property . . . under the same conditions" left the way open to nationalization of wealth, but was in reality a conservative measure which did not satisfy the Socialists. The statement that "work in its diverse forms is a social obligation and shall enjoy the protection of the law" and the provisions for social insurance indicate Socialist influence.

ARMY REORGANIZATION

For more than a century Spain had been at the mercy of an army which was more a political than a military instrument. The King's debt to the army was great, and every attempt to correct abuses which had crept into its organization was halted by the danger of offending it. Primo de Rivera's mistake in antagonizing a portion of the army, as has already been pointed out, was one of the principal causes for the success of the Revolution.

Not only did Republican Spain owe little to the army, but the army as organized and officered in 1931 was a distinct threat to the Republic. If the Monarchist officers, of whom there were many, should seize control of the army, a quick restoration of the Bourbons might be possible. Manuel Azaña, Minister of War, decided that the army must be immediately taken out of politics and made into a weapon for national defense. "In the reform of the army," he said, "the object has been a very simple one, though non-existent up to this time: it has been nothing other than to endow the Republic with a military policy."¹³ One of his first moves was to repeal the Law of Jurisdictions which gave the army the right to try all who criticized it.¹⁴ All officers were required to pledge allegiance to the Republic or resign, and to rid the army of surplus officers Azaña decreed that those who wished might retire on full pay.¹⁵ Azaña suppressed the eight or ten captains-general, and supplanted the Su-

11. Article 27 of the Constitution provides: "Freedom of conscience and the right to profess and practice freely any religion are guaranteed in Spanish territory, provided public morals are safeguarded . . . All denominations may observe their rites privately. Public celebration of the rites of a sect in each case must be authorized by the government." *Current History*, June 1932, p. 377.

12. *El Sol* and *New York Times*, October 14, 15, 1931.

13. Manuel Azaña, *Una Política* (Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1932), p. 141-172.

14. *New York Times*, April 18, 1931.

15. *The Statesman's Yearbook, 1933*; *Anuario Estadístico, 1931*, p. 490; *Extracto de organización militar de España*, July 1, 1933.

preme War and Naval Council with a court for trying military and naval cases only. He subsequently decreed that any retired officer convicted of taking part in politics should lose his pension. It is still too early to say whether by these measures Azaña definitely destroyed the army's political influence, but during the more than two and a half years of the Republic's life the army has exerted little if any pressure on the government.

Azaña was also determined to equip the Spanish army for future conflicts. The declaration in the Constitution that "Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy" and makes a declaration of war "subject to the conditions prescribed in the Covenant of the League of Nations" has generally been hailed as a great step in internationalism, and justly so. But war, and not peace, is implied in this article of the Constitution. It was a declaration that Spain would not remain neutral in any future conflict in which the League may take part.

AGRARIAN REFORM

Spain's most important problem remains the establishment of a prosperous agriculture. Although a notable increase has taken place in industry and the towns have assumed greater importance, some 75 per cent of the people still depend directly on agriculture for a living. In the past Spain has not cultivated all of its soil nor the best of it. About 60 per cent is left uncultivated, and only 27 per cent is cropped each year.¹⁶ This situation has arisen "because access could not be had to much of the good land" and the result has been that "the agricultural classes have had to cultivate other, bad land that should be used for forest."^{16a} It may be said, in general, that in the southern and western part of Spain land is held in enormous estates, only partly cultivated, while northern, northwestern, and to some extent parts of eastern Spain suffer from excessive division of the land into small farms. The great estates are cultivated largely by landless farm workers who have been completely at the mercy of the landlords, while the regions where small farms abound are cultivated by renters, sharecroppers and leaseholders who are frequently dispossessed on any convenient pretense. Even where they own their land and may not be dispossessed, their farms are usually too small to produce a crop sufficient for the needs of a family.

This situation has created a problem which the Monarchy was unable to solve, and on the solution of which the future of the Republic depends. The economic status of farm workers has been extremely low and their

social condition even worse. Few if any schools have been available, and in some provinces illiteracy in rural sections has reached 85 per cent. The peasants have lived in small villages and hamlets reached in many cases neither by railroad, highway nor telephone. Their cultural life is practically nonexistent, and their political hopes have been stifled by systematic falsification of electoral results.

While some technical and social progress had doubtless taken place before 1931, agrarian conditions were still deplorable. The need of reform was urgent, and the Cortes framed the Agrarian Reform Law with a double aim in view: to distribute the soil more equitably and to endow it with the necessary technical assistance, such as irrigation projects, for scientific cultivation; and to build in Spain a new social and political order through improvement of the condition of the rural population.

Owing to opposition from vested interests, the agrarian law was not passed until September 1932. A year was allowed for preliminary study, including a census of the workers, thus delaying actual application of the law until September 1933. The law creates an Institute of Agrarian Reform and endows it with fifty million pesetas a year.¹⁷ Fourteen provinces where the large estates are numerous are the first to come under the law, but large estates wherever located may be expropriated. No compensation is allowed for feudal estates, but other lands are to be paid for by capitalizing the value shown on the tax records at the rate of 5 per cent for farm incomes up to 15,000 pesetas. The rate then rises to 20 per cent for incomes of 200,000 pesetas and over. The expropriated lands are to be distributed to individual farmers or to associations of farm workers for collective farming, and vacant lands formerly embraced in the large estates are to be colonized and towns built on them. The law provides that "once in possession of the land, the communities will decide by majority vote whether the land is to be worked individually or collectively, and if individually, will proceed to divide and distribute it, taking into account the nature of the land, the capability of the rural families and other factors that will contribute to the maintenance of the economic equality of the members." The land so distributed belongs to the state and the occupant may be dispossessed for abuse of the property, but the Institute must give compensation for improvements made by the occupant. The Institute will also encourage the formation of cooperative societies for purchasing food, farm machinery and other necessities, and for securing credit.

16. Pascual Carrion, *La Reforma Agraria* (Madrid, Editorial Pueyo, 1931), p. 13 ff.

16a. *Ibid.*

17. For the Agrarian Reform Law and the Decree, cf. *Gaceta de Madrid*, September 21, 23, 25, and November 5, 1932.

"All feudal contributions whether in money or in kind are abolished without right of indemnification," and a great many charges known as *foros* and *subforos* levied against the land heretofore are subject to revision, as well as the special obligation known as the *rabassa morta* collected in Catalonia. The basic reform has been supplemented by a great many auxiliary laws intended to correct any weaknesses it may show in practice. The establishment of irrigation systems, the construction of new roads, agricultural schools and experimental farms is a part of the general scheme of building a new agrarian system. As yet the entire program is in its preliminary state, and its results will depend entirely on the way in which it is carried out.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

One of the serious problems which the Provisional Government had to face from the first was that of separatism. Four hundred years' effort toward unification had not deprived Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque provinces of their desire to regain the autonomous rights they had once enjoyed. The Monarchy had failed to settle this question, and the First Republic had been torn apart by inability to reconcile the claims of the various regions. Catalonia had been converted from mild conservative regionalism to violent separatism by the policy of the dictatorship, and would not cooperate with the revolutionaries until promised a satisfactory settlement of its demands. When the revolution came in April 1931, Catalonia established the Catalan Republic. Colonel Macià announced that Catalonia would be one of the states of the "Federated Spanish Republic." He was persuaded to retreat from this position by President Alcalá-Zamora, on the promise that the Cortes would consider a Catalonian Statute, prepared in Catalonia and approved by a plebiscite. This statute was drafted by a Catalan Assembly known as the Generality,¹⁸ ratified overwhelmingly by the people and presented by Colonel Macià to the Spanish Cortes on August 14, 1931.¹⁹ Discussion of the Constitution was in progress at the time, and President Alcalá-Zamora suggested that it should take precedence over the Statute, a suggestion which was adopted. The Catalans manifested much impatience over this delay, but the Statute did not come up for discussion until May 1932, and was not finally approved until September 1932.²⁰

Catalonia is defined in the Statute as an "autonomous region within the Spanish State."²¹ The principal contention of the

Catalans, however—that Catalonia was to be considered an independent region delegating certain of its prerogatives to the Spanish state—was denied. The powers granted Catalonia over finances, police, justice, education and social services are extensive, but both in the Constitution and in the Statute the rights of Catalonia are enumerated, and it is declared that the state reserves those not specifically granted. The Statute does not meet the demands of all Catalans. A rather numerous Left Wing demands much greater freedom, and as late as August 1933 *La Falc*, an organization forming a part of Macià's following, declared: "the Republic has not completely satisfied our desires nor the Statute our national aspirations."²²

The Basque provinces have not been so successful as Catalonia in pressing their demands. Their first efforts to frame a Statute met with failure because of internal dissensions, and only in November 1933 was their Statute approved by a plebiscite.²³ Before the Statute becomes effective, it must be approved by the Spanish Cortes.

CHURCH AND STATE

That the relations of the State and the Church would be altered under the Republic was evident from the beginning. The only question was how the change would be brought about, and to what extent the Church would be deprived of the privileges it had enjoyed for centuries under the Monarchy. Until 1857 education had been practically the exclusive right of the Church, and a law promoting popular state education passed in that year became a dead letter because of Church opposition. In 1931 half of the children who were in school were being educated by the Church, while both state and municipal schools were under its supervision. Hospital work, nursing, charity and many other functions were still the prerogatives of the Church, and their general deficiency could largely be attributed to the inability of the Church to meet the needs of the nation, and its consistent opposition to further state intervention in these fields. The reputed wealth of the Church had also fanned popular animosity. The Jesuits and other orders were thought to be enormously wealthy. The Church was tax exempt and received compensation from the state for lands it had lost in the nineteenth century. Its wealth had identified the Church with the capitalist system precisely at a time when both Socialism and Anarcho-Syndicalism were gaining ground. Thus the Church had incurred the enmity of Liberals and Republicans who considered it an obstacle to education, and of the laboring classes which objected to its great wealth. Long-standing animosity toward

18. For full text, cf. *El Sol*, July 14, 1931.

19. *Ibid.*, August 14, 1931.

20. *La Prensa* (New York), December 30, 1931, January 11, March 4, September 26, 1932.

21. *Gaceta*, September 21, 1932.

22. *El Sol*, August 21, 1933.

23. *La Prensa* (New York), November 7, 1933.

the Church dating from the nineteenth century²⁴ flared up again in a series of riots which began on May 11, 1931. Dozens of churches and monasteries were burned or destroyed, and the total property damage amounted to some five million dollars.

Even the most conservative members of the government favored separation of Church and State. The anti-clerical attitude of the Republic soon became apparent. Provincial governors were ordered to absent themselves from church services, and negotiations were opened with the Vatican. President Alcalá-Zamora announced late in May, however, that "the Government will not adopt any definite policy toward the Church before duly elected Cortes can work out the delicate problem of separation of Church and State."²⁵ It has already been noted that the Constitution provided for such a separation and empowered the government to supplement the Constitution by laws governing religious orders, church property, marriage and divorce. The Cortes had been given a clear mandate to dissolve the Jesuits, a step considered essential because of the growth of the religious orders during the twentieth century.²⁶ In January 1932 the Cortes dissolved the Jesuit order and seized its property. At the same time the cemeteries were secularized and religious burial prohibited unless provided for in the will of the deceased. The appropriation formerly given to the Church by the state was cut by one-third in the 1932 budget, and ceased entirely after November 1933. A law permitting divorce was passed in February 1932, giving the civil courts jurisdiction over such cases. Divorce is allowed by mutual consent after two years of marriage, but where divorce is granted for cause the guilty party may not marry until one year after the final decree.²⁷ In June 1932 a law provided that "from the date of the publication of the present law only one form of marriage is recognized—civil marriage."²⁸ Another decree provided that "the ecclesiastical corps of the army is dissolved."²⁹

These measures provoked bitter opposition to the Cabinet and the Republic. By mid-summer 1932 the Catholics were strongly

united in the *Acción Católica*, a non-political body for the defense of the Church, and the *Acción Popular*, a political party intended to unite all supporters of the Church. The measures adopted against the Church aroused the sympathy of some of the republican parties for the views of *Acción Católica*. Miguel Maura with his Conservative party carried on a campaign against the Azaña government, and Alejandro Lerroux, although still professing anti-clericalism, objected to the manner in which the anti-clerical legislation had been applied. These forces were not strong enough to stop the attack on the Church, however, and in December 1932 a law restricting the religious orders was presented to the Cortes. Owing to the bitter opposition and the obstructionist tactics of its opponents, it was not finally approved until June 1933, and when approved provoked a crisis in the government. The law³⁰ confiscates the property of the orders, estimated with other church property at \$500,000,000.³¹ It also enforces the "prohibition of the practice of industry, commerce or teaching" as provided in Article 26 of the Constitution. According to its terms, all primary teaching was to be taken out of the hands of the orders by December 31, 1933, and all other instruction by October 1933.³² This last provision led to the publication of a pastoral³³ by the bishops of Spain in which attendance of state schools was strictly forbidden, and the families of the faithful were ordered to send their children to Catholic schools.³⁴ The religious orders have also sought to evade the law by the organization of corporations for teaching, and one of Spain's most prominent intellectuals complains of the "increasing prosperity of the extinguished Company of Jesus which, under a different title, multiplies the number of its schools and prepares itself to enjoy a splendid, though subterranean, existence."³⁵ At present the full strength of the Church is behind the political parties calling for a complete revision of anti-clerical legislation, and it is not unlikely that the victory of the Right parties in the November 19 election will be followed by modification of the present laws.

24. Zabala (*Historia de España*, cited, I, p. 314) says that the people attacked the monasteries in 1834 killing "one hundred religious."

25. *New York Times*, May 30, 1931.

26. Increase in number of clergy in Spain 1900-1930:

Year	Monks	Nuns	Total	Total per 10,000 Population
1900	12,142	42,596	54,738	29.42
1910	13,539	46,357	59,896	30.02
1923	17,210	54,605	71,815	33.16
1930	20,642	60,758	81,400	34.54

Anuario, 1931, p. 664.

Number of communities of religious orders in 1930 and to what dedicated:

	Teaching	Charity	Contemplation	Other	Total
Monks	514	35	147	326	1,022
Nuns	1,432	1,128	863	463	2,886

Anuario, 1931, p. 667.

27. *Gaceta*, May 12, 1932.

28. *Ibid.*, July 4, 1932.

29. *Lu* (Paris), July 22, 1932.

30. For full text of the law, cf. *La Informacion* (New York), June 7, 1933.

31. *Ibid.*, May 19, 1933, and *New York Times*, June 6, 1933, give this estimate.

32. The Republic has created 9,620 schools, and 665 kindergartens. It has raised the pay of about 85.5 per cent of its teachers, and in two years approximately 481,000 students were placed in school. The total amount of money dedicated to education by the state increased from 209,861,049 pesetas in 1931 to 310,798,204 pesetas in 1933. For the important work done in education by the Republic, cf. Rodolfo Llopis, *La Revolución en la Escuela* (Madrid, M. Aguilar, 1933); and *Boletín de Educación* (Ministerio de Instrucción Pública, Enero-Marzo, 1933), p. 174 ff.

33. For a copy of the Pope's encyclical condemning this law and of the bishop's pastoral, cf. *En Estas Horas de Tribulación*, a pamphlet published by the Asociación de propagandistas Católicos de Campostela (Santiago), 1933.

34. *New York Times*, June 4, 1933.

35. Américo Castro, "La cuestión religiosa en España," *El Sol*, August 12, 1933.

THE REPUBLIC AND LABOR

Organized labor played a leading part in establishing the Republic, and expected to be rewarded for its services. The Socialists especially were under obligation to the workers for their support, and the inability of the Socialists to carry out all their promises greatly contributed to the unpopularity they incurred in 1933. The labor legislation of the Republic,³⁶ however, constituted a great improvement and may be attributed mainly to Largo Caballero, Socialist Minister of Labor, and Indalecio Prieto, Socialist Minister of Public Works.

A law of Labor Contracts³⁷ gave the laborer an effective collective bargaining instrument. National employment offices were provided and all private offices closed.³⁸ The law of *Términos Municipales*,³⁹ called by Largo Caballero⁴⁰ "the most revolutionary of the Republic because it safeguards the political rights of the working class, subjugated before to the economic tyranny of the *cacique*,"⁴¹ has been particularly effective. It creates a classified register of workers in each municipality⁴² and forbids the importation of workers from other municipalities until all local residents of any given occupation are employed. Its object is to prevent the importation of workers in order to lower wages or, as was customary under the Monarchy, to turn an election to the advantage of the *cacique*. None of the legislation of the Republic has been more bitterly attacked, and the propertied classes cited it in every petition and at every congress as an assault on their rights.

Republican contributions to labor also include a National Unemployment Fund⁴³ and a Law of Labor Associations.⁴⁴ Cooperatives of consumers, laborers, merchants and farmers may be established, but such cooperatives may not transact business except with their own members, and the Ministry of Labor is empowered to audit their accounts.⁴⁵ A new eight-hour day law raises the pay for overtime from 20 to 25 per cent

of the regular wage and empowers the Minister of Labor to cut the day to six hours or even less in mines and other exhausting occupations.⁴⁶ The accident compensation law was modified to supplant the single payment for injuries by a series of payments ranging from 9 to 75 per cent of the usual wage, according to character of the accident, and guarantee the payments to the laborer by a national fund.⁴⁷ Agricultural laborers are also protected by the accident insurance.⁴⁸ An Act of May 26, 1931, which modified an older law, makes maternity insurance obligatory for employers and allows a rest period before and after childbirth.⁴⁹

Obviously, whatever benefits labor was to obtain from the Republic would depend on the machinery established to supervise labor legislation.⁵⁰ With this in mind, Largo Caballero centralized the Ministry and charged the Minister with final responsibility for law enforcement. The first responsibility for enforcement of labor legislation, however, is placed on the Labor Delegates⁵¹ (*Delegado de Trabajo*) of each province, who are invested with full authority, including the authority over labor formerly exercised by the provincial governors. No labor association may function until its charter is approved by the Delegate, and he may impose fines or suspend such associations. The most important function of the Delegate is to act as the administrative officer for the Minister in each province and to impose penalties for infraction of the labor laws.⁵²

Labor disputes and strikes are directly in the hands of the *Jurados mixtos*,⁵³ juries composed of six representatives of both workers and employers. This idea is not new, but an innovation introduced in Spain has made such juries a powerful weapon for the protection of labor. This innovation comes in the selection of the president. If the twelve men agree unanimously, they may choose the president; in case they disagree, this power is exercised by the Minister of Labor. Since the Minister was a Socialist and himself a worker, for more than two and a half years the juries have had presidents who sympathize with the worker's point of view. This situation has brought a united protest from merchants, industrialists and landlords. In a number of cases heavy fines were imposed on employers for failure to obey the decisions of the juries, and in Madrid the entire directorate of the Merchants' Committee was arrested late in June

36. Spain has ratified some thirty conventions recommended by the International Labor Office, twenty-two of them since the establishment of the Republic. In most cases the appropriate legislation has been enacted, but this work was slowed up by the crisis in the government beginning in the spring of 1933. For these conventions, cf. *Los convenios Internacionales de trabajo y su ratificación por España* (Madrid, Ministerio de Trabajo, 1932).

37. *Labor realizada desde la proclamación de la República hasta el 8 de septiembre de 1932* (Ministerio de Trabajo 1932), p. 59 ff.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 71 ff.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

40. *El Sol*, October 3, 1933.

41. A political boss.

42. The Spanish municipality embraces all of the country to the next municipal boundary, thereby including farming as well as urban territory.

43. *Gaceta*, May 27, October 2, 1931.

44. *Labor Realizada*, p. 85 ff.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 95 ff.

46. *Gaceta*, July 2, 4, 1931.

47. *Ibid.*, October 12, 1932, and February 2, 7, 1933.

48. *Ibid.*, June 13, August 30, 1931.

49. *Los Convenios*, p. 23; *Gaceta*, September 9, 1931.

50. *Labor Realizada*, *passim*.

51. *Gaceta*, May 15, 1932.

52. *Gaceta*, June 24, 1932.

53. *Ibid.*, November 28, 1931.

1933, and the *Círculo de la Unión Mercantil*, an organization corresponding somewhat to a Chamber of Commerce, was closed. This action naturally caused a protest of the propertied classes, and throughout the summer there was intense activity looking to the union of all merchants, manufacturers and landlords against the labor policy of the Republic. A *Junta Central*, or Central Committee, was formed in July, and among its strongest resolutions were those against the Minister of Labor himself and against the Labor Delegates and the *Jurados mixtos*.⁵⁴ No small share of the responsibility for the almost complete paralysis of the legislation of the Republic during the summer of 1933 and the subsequent fall of the Azaña Ministry rests on this Central Committee and its representatives in the Cortes.

One aspect of the labor situation was handled in a way which brought strong criticism of the Republic from friend and foe alike. A considerable unemployment problem faced the new government from its first day. Many of the unemployed were concentrated in a few of the large cities, and their discontent had played an important part in the establishment of the Republic. To check this discontent, the government launched a public works program which many have considered ill-advised and badly planned. Madrid began an extensive project designed to connect the three railways stations by an underground tunnel and endow the city with a complete underground system of transportation. Road-building, electrification of the railroads, irrigation projects, and many other much needed improvements were also started. These cannot be criticized on the ground that they were not beneficial, but the cost was enormous and the projects frequently seemed designed more to give jobs than to construct needed public works. Whether the Socialists were entirely responsible for this public works program, costing more than 860,000,000 pesetas in 1933, the fact that Indalecio Prieto, a Socialist, was Minister of Public Works caused the blame to fall on them.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

Enormous sums of money were necessary for the work of the Republic at a time when Spain was feeling the effects of the world depression. When the Republic was established, hundreds of landlords immediately declared that they would not cultivate their lands. This crisis was largely overcome by a decree forcing cultivation, but the Republic

did not entirely escape the effects of systematic sabotage by the landlords.

Another economic difficulty concerned the flight of capital. For several months after April 1931, the nobles and rich bourgeoisie of Spain systematically exported their capital. The peseta, which at its lowest was worth 10.34 cents in 1930, sank to below 8 cents under the Republic. The Monarchy, moreover, had bequeathed to the Republic an enormous public debt, amounting to more than 21,000,000,000 pesetas,⁵⁵ and a chronic budgetary deficit, together with an unfavorable trade balance. Moreover, the world price of Spain's chief products—olive oil, wine, cork, oranges, flax, and iron and copper ores—declined almost continuously from 1931 to 1933.

Spanish exports fell from 2,299,700,000 pesetas in 1930 to 990,300,000 in 1931 and to 742,300,000 pesetas in 1932.⁵⁶ Through the first eight months of 1933 this decline continued, exports falling from 664,014,000 pesetas for the January-August period in 1931 to 434,568,000 pesetas for 1933.⁵⁷ There was a slight increase in the volume of goods shipped in this period, but the lower prices kept the net return to Spain far below that of former years. Internal conditions reflected this loss of foreign trade. Industrialists and farmers alike alleged that they could not keep up employment and wages in the face of falling prices. Attempts to cut wages were made at a time when the worker expected to receive better pay, and when the reorganized Labor Department was backing the workers in their demands. Hundreds of strikes and labor disputes further threw the economic system out of joint.

In spite of the depression, the budgetary appropriations of the Republic have been steadily rising. Total expenditures for 1930 were 4,012,500,000 pesetas, leaving a deficit of 158,240,000 pesetas that year. The estimated budget for 1933 is 4,711,000,000 pesetas, leaving a deficit of 783,760,000. The deficits for 1931 and 1932 were 508,830,000 pesetas and 711,730,000 pesetas, respectively, making a total deficit of more than two million pesetas for the three budgets of the Republic.⁵⁸ To meet this deficit the Republic has had to increase the public debt inherited from the Monarchy. This has been done by the flotation of bonds totaling 1,385,000,000 pesetas to October 1933,⁵⁹ and it is expected that further loans will have to be floated.

55. *El Sol*, April 1, 1932.

56. These figures are taken from *Resumen Mensual . . . del Comercio exterior de España*, published by the *Ministerio de Hacienda*, and from the *World Almanac*, 1931-1933. The two sources do not agree in all cases but are approximately the same.

57. *El Sol*, October 11, 1933.

58. *El Financiero* (Madrid), June 6, 1933.

59. *Ibid.*, August 23, 1933; *La Prensa* (New York), October 23, 1933.

54. *El Sol*, July 1, 15, 19, 20, 21, 31, and *Luz*, September 6, 1933 and also other dates give a picture of this controversy from the owners' point of view; *El Socialista* (Madrid) may be consulted for the workers' side of the question.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE REPUBLIC

The Republic accomplished its reforms only by overcoming great difficulties. From the beginning it has been forced to meet bitter opposition from both the Left and the Right. Three forces have slowed up the republican program: the Anarcho-Syndicalist *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*, which directed the labor opposition; the reactionary group; and the Cabinet which, being a coalition, was constantly forced into compromises in order to maintain a semblance of unity.

ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST AND COMMUNIST REVOLTS

Spain became a republic at a time when depressed economic conditions were causing a renewal of strike activity. Before the establishment of the Republic, strikes were fostered by the Socialists, Anarcho-Syndicalists and Communists, but when the Socialists became a part of the governing coalition most of their efforts were expended in securing a peaceful settlement of labor troubles through the Socialist Minister of Labor. Both Anarcho-Syndicalists and Communists, however, increased their agitation, and on four occasions attempted the overthrow of the Republic by revolution.

Serious strike activities began in June 1931, and the first determined effort at revolution was made by the Anarcho-Syndicalists, probably aided by the Communists, in July 1931.⁶⁰ A seven-day battle was fought in Sevilla from July 18 to 25, with over a dozen persons killed and a hundred or more wounded. This movement failed, but strike activities were not ended. Martial law was frequently declared, and by October 1931 Prime Minister Azaña found it necessary to resort to a law known as the Defense of the Republic granting the government exceptional powers.⁶¹ Arbitrary arrests and holding of prisoners without charge became common. Some nine thousand political prisoners were in jail by the summer of 1933, when this law was supplanted by another, called the "Law of Public Order,"⁶² giving the government the right to suspend constitutional guarantees and arrest people considered dangerous to the state.

Such drastic action has been considered necessary to meet continued opposition, but has not succeeded in ending strikes and Left opposition. A second revolt began in January 1932, and was crushed after hard fighting, while a third serious effort of the Left occurred in January 1933, and cost the lives of some fifty workers and soldiers. A fourth revolt occurred December 8, 1933, and seems to open a new revolutionary period. The government's policy of strike-breaking

has provoked a decided reaction among the workers. The fact that the Socialists were represented in the government has given strike-breaking the appearance of war between the Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists.⁶³

OPPOSITION FROM THE RIGHT

The Monarchists and other conservative groups were demoralized in the early days of the Republic, but began to reorganize without delay. Their weakness in the Cortes, where they had only 60 out of 470 deputies, prevented any really effectual opposition to the republican program during the first year and, frightened by the socialist legislation of the Cortes, they attempted a revolution in August 1932. The movement failed completely, and the Right groups have since that time depended on political action to regain their lost privileges.

Political opposition has proved more effective than armed revolt. The formation of the *Acción Católica* for the defense of the Church, and of the *Acción Popular* for political action, has already been noted. The organization of the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* brought the Right forces into still closer alignment. Originally the Right was represented only by the Agrarian and Basque-Navarre parties. In 1931 and 1932, however, many regional parties were organized for the defense of the conservative interests, and the C.E.D.A. came into existence in February 1933 to give them strength. It included practically all of the parties, from merely reactionary republicans to Monarchists who supported Alfonso or the Carlist pretender.⁶⁴ The C.E.D.A. proposes to revise the Constitution, repeal the anti-clerical laws, abolish the Agrarian Reform and put an end to the preponderant influence labor has exercised since April 1931. In many of these aims the C.E.D.A. has been ably seconded by the Central Committee of the merchants, industrialists and landlords.⁶⁵ In addition to the Right forces included in the C.E.D.A., Spain has a Fascist movement directed by José Primo de Rivera, son of the former dictator. The Fascists are openly opposed to the Republic, and have declared that they will rule in Spain even if they have to gain power by armed revolution. They are not as yet numerically strong, but the experience of Italy and Germany seems to indicate that only a short length of time is necessary for the development of a powerful Fascist movement.

63. Cf. *El Sol* or other Spanish papers of corresponding date for these revolts. The four major ones have been reported in New York papers, and all of them in *La Prensa* (New York).

64. The Carlists, who have been active since 1833, are followers of Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand VII who pretended to the throne against Isabel II.

65. Cf. p. 241.

60. *El Sol*, July 15 to 26, 1931.

61. *Ibid.*, October 15 to 21, 1931.

62. *Gaceta*, July 30, 1933.

POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS IN 1933

One of the most important forces working for reaction has been the split in the coalition cabinet. The divergent elements composing the cabinet had been able to unite only because all agreed on one minimum demand—overthrow of the King. Once these elements were in power their differences on political, economic and religious matters came into the open. Only fear of reaction or further revolution kept the inevitable split from occurring sooner than it did. President Alcalá-Zamora and Miguel Maura represented the conservative point of view, their revolutionary aims going little further than overthrow of the King and establishment of a democratic republic. Both were Catholic, both represented the land-owning classes, and both had recently been converted to Republicanism. The return to constitutional government satisfied their principal revolutionary demands. Their conflict with the Provisional Government over the Church issue has been noted.

Slightly to the Left at the beginning stood Alejandro Lerroux and Martínez Barrios of the Radical Republican party. Lerroux had for years been the outstanding opponent of the Monarchy and the Church. With the King gone and the Church divested of many of its privileges, he became a fighter without opponents. For a time he cooperated with the government, but in December 1931 his conservative economic ideas caused him to refuse to cooperate with the Socialists, and his stand in favor of centralism as opposed to federalism in government ranged him against the Catalans. He withdrew from the coalition at that time and joined the opposition. The remaining members of the coalition—the Republican Action, Socialists, Catalans, Galicians and Radical Socialists—managed to hold together until 1933, but their ideas were widely divergent and the program of the Republic was seriously held up by constant disagreement and compromise. Azaña was able to keep the Republican-Socialist alliance together only because he could drive the Republicans to accept measures of a more socialistic character than they wanted, and could persuade the Socialists to accept less than they had originally demanded. But neither side was satisfied. The Republicans resented the laws presented by the Socialists, while the latter, closely pressed by Anarcho-Syndicalists and Communists and unable to fulfill their promises to the workers, became alarmed at the prospect of losing their followers and began to talk of revolt and dictatorship. In other words, the character of the political struggle had changed radically by midsummer 1933. The main question was no longer Monarchy or Republic,

but whether the Republic was to be bourgeois or socialist in character.

That a political crisis was approaching was evident after April 1933, when elections were held in about one-third of the municipalities. According to Spanish law, unopposed candidates were allowed to take office at the time of the elections of 1931 without the formality of a vote. The April 1933 elections were held to fill these places with new and duly elected officials, and the government parties won less than one-third of the municipal councillors, causing the opposition parties, both Republican and those of the extreme Right, to call on the Azaña cabinet to resign.⁶⁶ This reverse at the polls was followed by a cabinet crisis early in June 1933. President Alcalá-Zamora forced the Azaña Ministry to resign, but Azaña was returned to office when all efforts to form a cabinet without him and the Socialists failed. His new cabinet was never strong. During the summer its weakness became more and more evident, and by August the program of legislation was almost completely paralyzed by the break-up of the Republican-Socialist coalition.

Azaña, who had been accustomed to apply the cloture rule to force his measures through, now found this procedure impossible, and was obliged to compromise not only with the opposition Republicans but with the Agrarians, avowed enemies of the régime. The explanation of this situation lies in the division of his supporters. The Federal party was split, and discontented with the Azaña program; the Catalan Left was absorbed in regional affairs; the Galician Left was disgruntled over the slowness with which the regional aspirations of Galicia were granted, and was opposed to the Azaña Ministry because of a projected treaty with Uruguay which injured its cattle interests; the Radical-Socialists party was engaged in an internal struggle for leadership which soon split it into a pro-Socialist wing headed by Marcelino Domingo, and an anti-Socialist wing under the leadership of Gordón Ordás.

The eventual fall of the Ministry was inevitable, but it was hastened by a second set of elections. The Constitution provides that the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees shall have, in addition to other members, one

66. It is probably correct to interpret the elections as an anti-government vote, but not necessarily as anti-Republican. The elections were held where 29,804 municipal councillors were seated in accordance with Article 29 of the law in 1931. In 1931 there were 13,940 Republicans, 887 Socialists, 6,065 Monarchists, 10 Communists, 6,043 representing local parties and 2,859 unclassified candidates so seated. This shows that about 50 per cent were either Republicans, Socialists or Communists, all anti-Monarchical, while the other 50 per cent was considered at the time to be Monarchical. Complete returns are not yet available for April 23, 1933. The newspaper *C.E.D.A.* of May 20, 1933 shows that the government parties won 4,356 places, the anti-government Republicans 4,108, and the Right 6,481. This gives the Right 43.36 per cent of the total. *El Sol* (Madrid) gave the vote as 5,048 for the government, 4,206 for the anti-government republicans, and 4,954 for the Right, according to *Current History*, July 1933. Complete returns on this basis would give the Right only 43 per cent of the vote in the districts in which it had 50 per cent in 1931.

judge from each of fifteen regions elected by the municipal councillors. The elections held on September 3, 1933 resulted in a second defeat of the government.⁶⁷ This development caused the resignation of Azaña and the formation of a ministry under Lerroux on September 13. The same Republican parties which had refused to cooperate with Lerroux against the Socialists in June now accepted places in his ministry. Lerroux did not survive the first vote of confidence on October 3, however, and President Alcalá-Zamora entrusted the formation of a coalition of Republicans, excluding the Socialists, to Martínez Barrios of the Radical party. The President granted this ministry a dissolution of the Cortes and set general elections for November 19, 1933 with a supplementary election to be held on December 3 in districts where no candidate received the 40 per cent of the total vote required by law.

The significance of this general election was evident. Spanish voters, including 6,000,000 women who were to vote for the first time, were to have the first real opportunity to express their opinion of the Republic. At the time of the election of the Constituent Cortes in 1931 the economic principles of the various parties were so vague that the voters did not know for what program they were voting. This uncertainty had cleared up by 1933, and four chief alternatives were before the people:⁶⁸ the extreme Right represented by the C.E.D.A., organized by Gil Robles; the Right Center represented by Lerroux and Maura; the Republican Left with Azaña as the outstanding figure; and the Socialists. In general, all of the Right parties were grouped around the C.E.D.A., while the Left were badly divided. The C.E.D.A., for example, allied itself with the Fascist organization, and with the *Lliga Regionalista*, the conservative Catalan party headed by Francisco Cambó; the Radical party of Lerroux, the Radical-Socialists of Gordón Ordás and the Conservative party of Miguel Maura went on the ballot together. The conservative, almost reactionary, character of this alliance is demonstrated by the adhesion of Melquiades Alvarez of the Liberal Democratic party, a former Minister of Alfonso XIII, and of Santiago Alba, another former Minister, both of whom joined Lerroux on the ground that he gave the best hope for a "united anti-Marxist party." The conservative character of the Radical party was also demonstrated by its alliance in certain electoral districts with

the C.E.D.A., an alliance aimed at the Socialists. Azaña allied his Republican Action with the Independent Radical-Socialists of Marcelino Domingo, and with the Galician and Catalan Left. The Socialists went on the ballot alone, except for very limited cooperation with some of the Left parties in a few provincial districts.

The Right and Right Center parties won a sweeping victory.⁶⁹ The alignment in the newly elected Cortes was almost the exact reverse of that in the former Cortes. Where the Right had been able to elect barely 60 deputies in 1931, the Left elected less than a hundred in 1933. Some reaction had been expected and predicted before the election, but that the Right would win so completely was a surprise even to the leaders of the Right parties. Approximately two-thirds of the deputies are members of the C.E.D.A. whose principles are those of the Monarchy, or of the group centered around Lerroux whose program is distinctly conservative.

The Republican parties of the Left, including the Republican Action with Azaña at its head, the Independent Radical Socialists under the lead of Gordón Ordás, and the Federals were practically exterminated, dropping from a membership of well over a hundred to a mere handful. Considerable disorder occurred during the elections and charges of unfair tactics were numerous. Botella Asensi, Minister of Justice in the Martínez Barrios cabinet, resigned as a protest against the policy of the Prime Minister and alleged that Lerroux had an understanding with the extreme Right. This charge was given plausibility by Lerroux's action in withdrawing his candidate from the supplementary election held in Madrid on December 3, leaving the field to the extreme Right and the Socialists. The latter, who lost half of their representatives, also protested against irregularities in the elections, and Largo Caballero threatened that any attempt by the Right to take possession of the government and destroy the work done by the Republic would be met with armed revolution and a dictatorship along Communist lines. Little was said about the return of the King, although some twelve to fifteen deputies were elected as Alfonsists. The elections definitely mark an epoch in the life of the Republic. The revolutionary strike beginning December 8 indicates that the numerous laws passed since April 1931 cannot be repealed without provoking revolution, but the Right parties have already announced their intention of making an attempt in that direction. Spain seems to be facing a period of stock-taking in which there will certainly be numerous conflicts in the effort to decide how much of the new legislation is to be retained and how much discarded.

67. The government elected only five of the fifteen judges elected by the regions. Cf. *El Sol*, September 5, and *La Nación* (Madrid), September 5, 1933. *La Nación* gives incomplete returns showing 12,910 pro-government votes against 34,193 anti-government votes. The Radical party (Lerroux) elected four judges, and the extreme Right, six.

68. *La Prensa*, November 13, 1933; and *El Sol*, November 17, 1933.

69. *La Prensa*, December 5, 6, 1933.